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Abstract—The 5G mobile network is expected to meet the
diverse demands from multiple types of business services. At
the same time, some of the 5G use cases come with hard, and
often expensive to meet, requirements in terms of latency and
bandwidth. It is a common understanding that one system can
not fit all and there is a need for customizing network according
to the requirements of specific business use cases. Network slicing
is introduced to partition the physical network to different slices
to be configured for providing different quality of service as
requested by the slice’ operator and required by the slice’ users.
Since these slices will be used by the businesses, e.g. verticals,
allocating physical resources to the network slices, is not anymore
only a matter of performance but also a matter of revenue
and business model. In this paper, we address a joint resource
and revenue optimization a novel auction based model. Through
extensive simulation study, we demonstrate our proposed auction
model can allocate network resources to network slices for
providing (i) higher satisfaction of requirements per network
slice, and (ii) increased network revenue.
Index Terms—5G; network slicing; auction model; resource
allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
The next-to-come fifth generation (5G) mobile network is
expected to open unprecedented business opportunities to telco
operators by increasing their market to the business owners
and providing not only business-to-customer service (B2C)
services but also business-to-business (B2B) and and business
to business to consumer (B2B2C) services. Large number
of vertical industries are foreseen as natural users of 5G
beyond the mobile broadband services, including healthcare
automotive, smart cities, and industry automation [1]. In order
to deliver services to such wide range of industries with
diverse requirements, network slicing has been introduced in
5G networks, which can be then foreseen as a composition of
multiple slices, each one designed with a set of functionalities
tailored to serve a specific business.
From the network performance point of view, slicing implies
that each 5G slice needs to have its own set of allocated
resources and this aspect introduces a novelty in the man-
agement of network resources in mobile systems. Indeed, in
the previous generations of mobile networks, the resources to
be assigned to each application were mainly radio resources,
while in the 5G network, resources represent both radio and
core network [2], by means of computational and storage capa-
bilities in addition to the over-the-air data rate. The definition
by ITU in particular refers to a network slice as “a logically
isolated network partitions comprising as programmable re-
sources such as network, computation and storage” [3].From
the business point of view, however, the issue of pricing a
given slice is similar to pricing given spectrum, i.e., there is
no clear way to value a given created slice by the operator.
Therefore, there is a need for novel business model by the
operators.
In order to consider the fact that slice allocation in 5G
means allocating resources throughout the network, we model
5G network resources as multiple chunks, each one with a
different capacity, spread across the whole physical network.
This allows to take into consideration the management of
resources in the core network in addition to the resources in
the radio access. In order to optimize the network revenue by
considering network utilization aspects, we focus on a resource
management strategy based on a novel competitive auction
mechanism combined with an optimization algorithm for net-
work resources allocation. Therefore, objectives are increasing
network utilization, enhancing satisfaction of requirements of
network slices and increasing the incentive for operators by
maximizing their revenue.
In this paper, we focus on a network slicing strategy based
on a novel auction mechanism in order to maximize the
network revenue. It is very well-suited compared with the
other possible mechanisms. The network chunks and slices can
interact with each other and our proposed auction mechanism
can be viewed as an effective method for analysis of interactive
decision making [4]. The proposed auction mechanism is
applied to the problem of price decision in our proposed
system model. Moreover, our proposed auction mechanism can
be act as a key mechanism for resource allocating to network
slices for maximising the network revenue. Compared with
previous researches which mainly focus on price definition,
our proposed auction mechanism considers the amount of
network resources the network slices are requesting to the
network. Therefore, our proposed auction mechanism can be
used to enhance satisfaction of requirements of network slices
and to maximize the network revenue.
In summary, the key contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as follows.
• We formulate a novel business network model for pro-
viding 5G network slices computational and storage re-
sources in order to satisfy their resource requirements
optimally. The network slice manager has been designed
to determine different prices of network chunks and
provide a central view of the network information when
required.
• By considering both the demand and provision in network
chunks, we present a novel network slicing mechanism
based on economic based auction mechanism for network
slices. The proposed mechanism includes price auction
mechanism which is designed to decide the selling price
for different types of network chunks, and network slicing
auction mechanism which is designed to maximize the
network revenue.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II briefly review the state of art in network virtualization
for virtual resource sharing. After elaborating our system
model and concept definitions in Section III, the problem
formulations, our proposed resource sharing mechanism and
pricing mechanism will be described in Section V. Section VI
provides numerical results to verify our design objectives and
analyses performance observations. Finally, summary of our
work is detailed in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we briefly overview the most relevant studies
of auction based approaches for resource allocation.
From a resource allocation point of view, network slicing
drives the business models behind 5G ecosystem and is strictly
related to virtualization [5], enabling the management of
network functionalities across the network. There are three
different types of business models for network slicing which
are B2B, B2C, and B2B2C [6]. In addition, several solutions
for efficiently supporting network resource virtualization [7]
and resource allocation by using auction approaches [8] have
been proposed. They have been designed to improve the
quality of experience (QoE) of mobile users and network
utilization.
Focusing from a network resource slicing point of view, a
resource allocation strategy of virtualized resources for Long
Term Evolution (LTE) networks has been proposed in [9]. This
work proposed a slicing scheme to allocate resource blocks to
different service providers (SPs) in order to maximize the radio
utilization. The proposed scheme was dynamic and flexible
for addressing arbitrary fairness requirements of different SPs.
In our previous work [10], we focused on the topic of slice
association and resource allocation for mobile users with the
aim of increasing the QoE the users.
From an auction point of view, game theory based resource
auction mechanism have been widely investigated in existing
works [11]. Nash equilibrium was considered as the solution
for solving the problem of spectrum sharing in cognitive
radio networks in [12]. Stackelberg game mechanism has been
formulated for power control in wireless networks to maximize
the capacity [13] [14]. In [15], an auction mechanism has
been proposed to maximize the expected revenue of sellers.
An auction-based scheme which can be used to develop a
synchronous algorithm for solving the optimization problem
of resource allocation has been proposed in [16]. The game
theory based network virtualization framework has been de-
scribed in [17] and an auction mechanism has been used for
pricing the instantaneous rate consumption. Compared with
the other game theory mechanisms, the auction mechanism
was widely applied [16] [18] in the situation of competitive
resource allocation. Meanwhile, effective allocation of network
resources can improve the revenue of both users and networks.
In [19], a competitive pricing model has been formulated in a
dynamic spectrum access where a few primary services offer
spectrum access opportunities to a secondary service.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we will describe our system model in
detail, also depicted in Fig. 1. The network resources are
considered to be of different types, each referred to as net-
work chunk (total number of network chunks is denoted by
M = {1, 2, ...,M}). The set of network chunk will shape
a network slice, denoted by K = {1, 2, ...,K}, to satisfy
the requirements. Such augmentation of resources from radio
access, core network and the cloud could be provided by
different mechanisms, examples of which are in [20], [21]
and [22].
Fig. 1. Service and Network Slicing System Model
Fig. 2. Service Slice Model
For the allocation of resource chunks to network slices, we
use the concept of priority level as according to the work in
[10]. The priority level of each slice k has been defined in the
range of αk = {1, 2, ..., A}, where A indicates the maximum
priority level in our system model. The higher αk, the higher
the priority level for the given slice k.
The system model supports allocation of different network
resources to network slices, including resources from different
radio access technologies, computational resource (i.e., CPU)
and the storage resource. The capability of each network chunk
m is denoted by ηm (m ∈M); this capacity has a different unit
depending on the type of network chunk. The amount of re-
sources assigned to each network slice k from network chunk
m is denoted by σk,m (m ∈M, k ∈ K). The ratio of resource
that slice k receives from the chunk m is denoted by σk,mηm .
Moreover, in the real network environment, different network
chunks will have different amount of resources, referred to as
“weight value”, and denoted as βm where m ∈M.
The network slice manager, within the depicted architecture
in Fig. 1, is assumed to be an impartial entity [23]. In this case,
cost values of different network chunks’ per unit have been
denoted as Ωm = {ωm|m ∈ M}, and Cm = {cm|m ∈ M}
indicates the selling price per unit of the network chunk m.
Fig. 2 shows an example where an operator offers five
different types of resource chunks to the slices. Such chunks
are radio resource, the computational and the storage resource
from the edge cloud, and the computational and the storage
resource from the central cloud. The network resources re-
quired by slice k from the network chunk m is denoted by
Rk,m. rk,m and Rk,m represent the minimum and maximum
resource requirements by network slice k from the network
chunk m, respectively.
IV. THE PROPOSED AUCTION MODEL
The auction mechanism consists of two main parts: a) the
price competition model; b) auction mechanism for network
slicing.
In order to maximize the network revenue, the network slice
manager should determine the price of network chunks cm
by using auction mechanism. Then, the competitive auction
mechanism for network slicing aims to achieve the optimal
resource allocation. These two parts will be further elaborated
below.
A. Price Competition
The price competition model can be applied to achieve the
equilibrium pricing, in a system where network chunks are
willing to sell their resources to network slices based on slices’
requirements. Therefore, the price strategy is determined by
the network slice manager in terms of network utility values
and capacity of network chunks, as well as the amount of
resources requested by network slices.
The profit maximization of the network chunks is formu-
lated as equation (1).
maximize Θ(Cm, σk,m) (1)
Where Θ(Cm, σk,m) has been defined in equation (2),
Θ(Cm, σk,m) =
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
σk,mcm − ωm
M∑
m=1
ηm (2)
where ωm is the cost value per unit of the virtual network
resource chunk m, and the value of ωm is defined as
ωm =
∑M
m=1 ηm∑K
k=1
∑M
m=1 σk,m
. (3)
Then, the profit per unit of network chunk m is given by
θm(Cm, σk,m) =
K∑
k=1
σk,mcm − ωm (4)
where the partial differential of the price for the virtual chunk
resource per unit is given by
∂θm(ηm)
∂cm
=
∂
∂cm
(
K∑
k=1
σk,mcm − ωm)
=
K∑
k=1
σk,m + cm
∂
∑K
k=1 σk,m
∂cm
− ωm ∂ηm
∂cm
(5)
In order to maximize the total profit of network chunks,
we formulate the profit value so as to maximize the network
chunks per unit. Therefore, ∂θm(ηm)∂cm = 0 and the equation (5)
can be derived as,
K∑
k=1
σk,m + cm
∂
∑K
k=1 σk,m
∂cm
= ωm
∂ηm
∂cm
(6)
∑K
k=1 σk,m
∂ηm
∂cm
+ cm
∂
∑K
k=1 σk,m
∂ηm
= ωm (7)
where we assume
∑K
k=1 σk,m = ηm. It means that the network
resource of chunk m has been totally sliced for all slices.
Therefore,
cm
∂ηm
∂cm
cm
ηm
+ cm = ωm (8)
cm(
1
∂ηm
∂cm
cm
ηm
+ 1) = ωm (9)
We assume that ε = ∂ηm∂cm
cm
ηm
, where ε is a small positive value.
Therefore, the value of cm is given by cm = εε+1ωm. Based
on the price value cm of per unit network chunk m, we can
also define our slice paid value based on their different priority
level as in equation (10),
pk,m = αkcmβm (10)
where pk,m is the price paid by slice k for the network chunk
m. cmβm indicates price of different network chunk m.
B. Auction Mechanism for Network Slicing
In the state of the art, the auction mechanism has been
widely used for price decision in order to improve the effi-
ciency of network resource allocation. In the model described
above, network slices can be considered as players and the aim
of the auction mechanism is maximizing the network revenue
for the owner (or operator) of the resource chunk.
To this end, our proposed auction based network slicing
mechanism can be described as follows.
• Choosing the optimal amount of network resources to
assign to network slice k based on its resource require-
ments. The generated network revenue from network slice
k is denoted by Uk(σk,m, pk,m, ωm) as (11).
Uk =
M∑
m=1
pk,mσk,m −
M∑
m=1
ωm (11)
• Calculating the network revenue after removing the net-
work slice k from the system. It can be described as
UK/{k}(σK/{k},m, pK/{k},m, ωm). Instead of allocating
network resource to slice k only based on its resource
requirements, our auction mechanism forces the network
slice manager to consider profit of the other slices (K−1).
The global objective of maximizing the total network
revenue has been taken into account. The function of
UK/{k} has been defined in (12).
UK/{k} =
∑
K/{k}
M∑
m=1
pK/{k},mσK/{k},m −
M∑
m=1
ωm (12)
• Maximizing the total network revenue by calculating∑K
k=1(Uk − UK/{k}).
• Finally, the network revenue generated by slice k is
described as equation (13).
UAuck = Uk − (maxUK/{k}) (13)
while the total network revenue is as follows,
UAuc =
K∑
k=1
UAuck (14)
• Therefore, the optimized resource allocated to the net-
work slice k from the network chunk m can be calculated
according to (15).
σ∗k,m = argU
Auc
k (15)
V. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we aim to maximize the network revenue from
both radio and cloud layers. The problem can be formulated
as in (16).
argmax
σ∗k,m
UAuc∑K
k=1[
∑M
m=1 σ
∗
k,m]
αk
(16)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
σ∗k,m ≤ ηm (16a)
rk,m ≤ σ∗k,m ≤ Rk,m, ∀k ∈ K, ∀m ∈M (16b)
where UAuc is the network revenue and σ∗k,m is the amount of
resources allocated to slice k on chunk m through the auction-
based mechanism.
The aim of our proposed auction mechanism is to maximize
the total network revenue while maximizing the capacity in
terms of number of slices to be deployed. The constraint (16a)
indicates that the amount of allocated resource cannot exceed
the maximum available resources, while the constraint (16b)
indicates that the received resource of the network slice k must
satisfy the resource requirements.
B. Resource Slicing Mechanism
1) Price Auction Mechanism: The Bertrand based price
auction mechanism has been proposed in order to receive the
selling price of network chunks per unit. The players in each
step are set of network chunks. The strategy of players is the
price per unit which is non-negative.
According to the network resources required from the
network slice k, the revenue of the network system can be
expressed as in (14). In the price auction mechanism, a chunk
cannot increase its profit by choosing a different action without
affecting others [19]. In this case, the optimized result is
obtained by defining a proper strategy for all participants from
the whole view of the auction model. By the definition of the
price auction mechanism in Section IV-A, we can receive the
selling price of each network chunk.
2) Resource auction Mechanism: The auction-based re-
source allocation mechanism aims to maximize the network
revenue and has been described in Algorithm 1. In the pro-
posed mechanism, the benefit of using our auction mechanism
is that it can guarantee to all the participants their QoS require-
ments, i.e., the assignment of, at least, the minimum amount of
requested resources for each chunk. Moreover, while satisfying
allocated network resources σk,m to all participants, network
revenue can be improved by our proposed auction mechanism
as well.
Algorithm 1: TWO-STEP AUCTION MECHANISM FOR
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
k: number of required service slices;
ηrestm : the rest resource of chunk m;
for k := 1 to K do
if Rk,m<ηrestm then
Calculate the network revenue because of slice k
based on the Equation 11 where the value of
received resource σk,m equals to the value of
their maximized requirements Rk,m;
Then, calculate the network revenue value of the
rest slices K − 1 according to the equation (12)
where the value of received resource σK/{k},m
equals to the value of their maximized
requirements RK/{k},m;
end
if rk,m<ηrestm <Rk,m then
Calculate the network revenue because of slice k
based on the equation (11) ;
Then, calculate the network revenue value of the
rest slices K − 1 according to the equation (12);
end
Calculate the revenue value of slice k based on
equation (14).
end
Fig. 3. Cumulative Network Resource Utilization (number of slices = 10)
VI. PERFORMANCE INVESTIGATION
In our simulation, we consider five different types of net-
work chunks, as depicted in Fig. 2. Radio network chunks
(m = 1) are considered to take into account over the air
resources. Values m = 2, 3 take into account storage and
computational resources, respectively, at the edge network,
while m = 4, 5 indicate such resources in the core network.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that resources required
by network slices is modeled as a ratio of the whole amount of
resources available for each chunk. The amount of allocated
resources to each network slice is described as
∑K
k=1 σ
∗
k,m ≤
100%. We set the amount of resources available in the radio
network chunk to 100%. To take into consideration the fact
that resources at the edge are scarcer than those in the core,
we set the amount of storage and computational resources
available at the edge to 40%, while we set these values to 60%
for the core network. Each slice requests a random portion of
resources for each chunk. Finally, the priority of each slide is
randomly chosen with the constraint that
∑K
k=1 αk = 1.
A. Performance Strategies
In our evaluations, we evaluate the performance of two
different strategies.
As a benchmark, we consider a priced-based network slicing
(PB-NS) algorithm which is based only on price competitive
mechanism, i.e., PB-NS implements (1).
Our proposed two-step auction mechanism for network
slicing (TA-NS) is based on (16) and it is implemented as
shown in Algorithm 1.
B. Analysis of results
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the performance in terms of resource
utilization (i.e., the amount of assigned resources) for different
network chunks. Fig. 3 considers a scenario with a limited
number of slices (i.e., 10). In this case, the amount of allocated
resources is lower for TA-NS w.r.t. PB-NS because the aim
of TA-NS is to maximize the network revenue This means
that TA-NS allocates more resources to slices generating more
revenue (i.e., by taking into consideration slices’ priority),
while PB-NS tries to accommodate slices’ requests without
considering the priority and the related priority. In a scenario
Fig. 4. Cumulative Network Resource Utilization (number of slices = 30)
Fig. 5. Average Satisfactory Level of Slices from Each Network Chunks
with few slices, increasing the amount of allocated resources
does not meaningfully increase the revenue (this will be
analyzed later). Fig. 4 consider a scenario with 30 slices. In
this case, TA-NS shows higher resource utilization than PB-
NS. That is due to the fact that, TA-NS minimizes the amount
of resources allocated to slices generating less revenue in order
to improve the allocation (and thus the revenue) for the slices
with higher priority.
Fig. 5 shows the average satisfactory level (for the case with
30 slices) for all network slices in different types of network
chunks based on the equation fk,m = 1k
∑K
k=1
σ∗k,m−rk,m
Rk,m−rk,m . It
can be noticed that TA-NS provides higher satisfactory level
to network slices than PB-NS. This is because TA-NS takes
into consideration the priority of slices and, as a consequence,
it is able to maximize the satisfaction of slices with high
priority while meeting the requirements of slices with lower
priority. On the contrary, PB-NS has lower satisfactory levels
as it does not consider the priority. Thus, PB-NS introduces
higher dissatisfaction for slices with higher priority, and this
consequently decreases the overall satisfaction.
Fig. 6 shows the cumulative network revenue by varying
the number of network slices. Firstly, this analysis confirms
the better behavior of our proposed TA-NS in being able
to maximize the network revenue. Fig. 6 also shows that in
scenarios with few number of slices (up to 6), TA-NS is able
to offer a revenue equal to that of PB-NS even if the resource
Fig. 6. Cumulative Network Revenue
utilization is lower (as shown in Fig. 3).
The results above testify that our proposed TA-NS is able
to increase the network revenue by taking advantage of slices’
priorities and without reducing the satisfaction experienced by
the slices.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel approach for network
slicing in the 5G networks. Our proposed approach is an
auction-based mechanism that considers radio network re-
sources, the storage and the computational resources for per-
forming resource and slice allocation. Our proposed auction
based approach increases the network revenue and optimize
the resource allocation by considering the limited network
virtual resources. Extensive simulations show increase in total
network revenue and efficiency in allocating network resources
to network slices, as well as enhancement in satisfying their
requirements.
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